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Floating Bodies 
Adrian Lahoud
Weaponizing Earth 
Our peacetime economic relations, working slowly and continuously, pro-
duce the same results as would a short global conflict, as if war no longer 
belonged to soldiers alone now that it is prepared and waged with devices 
as scientific as those used by civilians in research and industry. Through 
a kind of threshold effect, the growth of our means makes all ends equal.
 — Michel Serres 1
On July 14, 2008, an arrest warrant is issued from The Hague by the Chief 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Luis Moreno  Ocampo 
alleging that Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir systematically attempted 
to eradicate the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit people of Darfur. The charges 
in the warrant include war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 
Some eighteen months later in a convention center in Copenhagen, 
the Sudanese diplomat Lumumba Di-Aping, representing the G77 Group 
of Developing Nations, calls an impromptu press conference during the 
2009 Climate Conference. Di-Aping will return the accusation of geno-
cide back to the industrialized nations of the world: he will accuse them 
of systematically thwarting negotiation on climate change, failing to prevent 
a catastrophic temperature increase, and, therefore, condemning millions 
in Africa to certain death. Di-Aping is immediately described as a hysteric 
by sections of the press.
Between Ocampo and Di-Aping the contours of two different con-
cepts of violence come into view. The first addresses the past in order 
to deliver justice in the present. The second addresses the present in order 
to avert a future harm. The alleged genocide in the first instance is familiar, 
involving militias and their sponsors, a sequence of brutal massacres.  
The alleged genocide in the second is little understood and involves a set 
of unlikely agents: atmospheric patterns, ocean temperatures, indigenous 
groups, and climate scientists.
Whether it is ritualized through acts meant to subsume the individual 
within a group, or industrialized within the apparatus of modern warfare, 
it is impossible to think violence without an act which sets into play the  
very tools of violence. When it occurs, violence takes a punctual form — 
a solitary projectile moving through space, a cloud of shrapnel blooming 
in a crowded room. In turn, this occurrence organizes a space according 
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27, no. 1 ( January 2013): 44–53; and Radical Meteorol-
ogy (2013), three-channel video (3’46”, 4’12”, 5’53”) and 
two-channel audio.
2 Russell Schweickart, “Whose Earth?,” 1974. Transcription 
available at http://settlement.arc.nasa.gov/CoEvolution 
Book/SPACE.HTML, accessed November 2013.
3 See Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the 
Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
4 Donna J. Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_ Millennium. 
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(New York: Routledge, 1997), 24.
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Nature, ed. Bron Taylor (London: Continuum, 2006). 
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CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). 
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 Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1993), 29.
On the other hand, there is a forensic momentum that refers to a restless 
modern past that is currently being exhumed, unburied, and investigated, 
at a time when not just the nature of violence, but also the means of holding 
perpetrators accountable, are dramatically changing. The forensic here can 
serve the identitarian agenda of states or certain minorities, but it can also 
be essentially turned against state and symbolic power. The countless restitu-
tion claims concerning not only artifacts, but also human remains, which 
museums and other institutions are currently facing from victims of violence 
and formerly colonized people, further testify to the scope of forensic aes-
thetics as a mode not only of restoration of histories/continuities otherwise 
lost, but of their active construction. Forensic identification serves to estab-
lish “truth” as a means of the reconstruction of social bonds that have been 
destroyed, of different possible societies, a task which is most often related 
in this context to the identification of human remains. A map of exhumations 
of sites of political violence would show that we can truly speak of a global 
momentum, which points to a universal dimension of political violence 
in modernity and in the name of the state — a “negative” universality, 
to be sure, but one whose explication provides a possible “common ground,” 
a basis on which we can imagine what is missing from actual universality. 
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little resemblance to the conflicts of the past.
Every new weapon goes on to produce 
a new geopolitical relation. Nuclear weapons 
gave us bipolar cold war politics, “deter-
rence,” “balance of power,” and “mutually 
assured destruction”; similarly, “the war 
against terror” leaves us with “security,” 
“targeted assassination,” “nonstate actors,” 
and a burgeoning theoretical literature 
on urban warfare and its asymmetries. 
In turn, the conflict over carbon now calls 
for its own sets of terms and concepts, ones 
able to capture the diffuse, unfamiliar cau-
sality of violence that this conflict marks. 
Beginning with the production of  
energy from fossil fuels, in what follows 
a series of episodes that connect human 
industrialization to tropical weather sys-
tems, food production, and human move-
ment will be set out in order to begin the 
project of depicting this violence to come. 
In turn, each episode is brought into exis-
tence through a specific event with a spe-
cific scale. The concept of “scale” must 
be given a new sense here if we are to think our way beyond the mono-
theistic reductionism of the common, the complex, or the universal. 2 
Scale is defined in terms of an ontological, epistemic, and discursive  
genesis in which a problématique produces a bounded set of relations. 3 
With regard to the problem of climate, we will see that the concept 
of scale forces a Faustian reinscription of the political within the very 
heart of reason itself.
Floating Bodies
The clinamen manifests neither contingency nor indetermination […]. 
It manifests something entirely different, that is the irreducible plural-
ity of causes…
 — Gilles Deleuze 4
In order to liberate the potential energy fossilized in aromatic hydro-
carbons such as oil, coal and gas, the compressed remains of organic com-
pounds must undergo combustion, transforming dead photosynthetic 
material into heat. The advent of machines able to reliably convert these 
resources into energy has driven a radical intensification of human activity. 
to the trajectories of confrontation between the 
aggressor and their victim within a limit circum-
scribed by the possible extension through space 
of the combatants and their weapons. 
Nor is violence endless; its occurrence 
occupies a moment within time, finding its  
origin in the pressure applied to a trigger only 
to be extinguished with the life this pressure 
means to end. In its continual potential for 
escalation — even in our wartime invocations 
of peace — violence abides by all of this. It  
involves a weapon whose possible action and 
consequence is limited within the space-time 
of a violent event. The various ethical and moral 
norms which regulate and distinguish between 
the acceptable and unacceptable forms of vio-
lence arise from human experiences of violence: 
experiences whose character offends moral 
norms and solicits collective response in the 
form of laws that must be enforced, procedures 
that must distinguish between claimants 
in order to produce verdicts from which either 
recompense or punishment can flow. 
This is the violence and law we know. Is it pos-
sible, however, to imagine another kind of violence? Can we imagine a crime 
without a criminal? A violence without coordinates on which transgressions 
might be plotted? A violence with no “x” and with no “y”? A violence with 
no weapon and no witness, passing invisibly through the human sensori-
um — leaving no memory, no testimony, and no record? That is to say, can 
we imagine violence without a violent event? 
By what right would this impossibility warrant the word “violence,” let 
alone the term “crime”? If this early proposition is still too unformed, can 
we instead conceive of a world become weaponized? A world in which the 
very facts of everyday life, the basic habits and simple routines, by the sheer 
cumulative weight of their repetition, begin to consume, overwhelm, and 
finally destroy their host. Our sum, which now totals seven billion, does 
not only grow, it changes phase, bringing forth a different problem and 
a new internal topology, presenting a violence without limit and end —  
a violence that we are yet to recognize. 
The hypothesis here is that structural violence is criminal. If this is true, 
then the genesis of structure is a criminal event, the space of genesis its 
crime scene. This essay attempts to describe this violence to come, the signs 
of which have been with us since the start of our industrial society. It pro-
poses that the conflict over global carbon capacity is in very real terms  
a war, but a war whose agents, weapons, and theater of operations bear  
Fig. 1. International  
Criminal Court, Warrant 
for the Arrest of Omar 
al-Bashir issued March 
4, 2009. Source: http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs 
/doc/doc639078.pdf. 
Fig. 2. Draft of the 
so-called “Danish Text” 
from the 2009 United 
Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Copenha-
gen. Source: http:// 
www.theguardian.com 
/environment/2009/dec 
/08/copenhagen-climate 
-change.
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Meteora
Scientists can predict the time of an eclipse, but they cannot predict  
whether they will be able to see it […]. Meteorology is the repressed  
content of history. 
 — Michel Serres 8
 
In many ways, its spherical shape lends the Earth a sense of symmetry 
that is as complete as it is ideal. Even as our cartographic imaginary 
carves the globe into sovereign parts and their jurisdictions, dividing 
hemisphere from hemisphere, land from sea, and sea from air, the clin-
amen threads its complex path across all these parts, obeying no sover-
eignty or law, save those of physical and chemical interaction. The globe 
has no symmetry as such, only gradients of moisture, temperature, and 
pressure fighting to reach equilibrium, bandwidths of relative stability 
whose fate will be broken by infinitesimal fluctuations. The despotic 
blue sphere collapses this differentiation into a benign picture of balance 
and finitude when it is anything but. 
For example, as the industrialized North pours aerosols into the 
atmosphere, important equatorial asymmetries are differentially loaded, 
forcing shifts in precipitation patterns around the tropics. 9 The behav-
ior of the climatic system around the tropics is rich and complex due  
to powerful heat differentials and the intensity of moisture supply. The 
relatively high amount of solar exposure on the equator poses a problem  
in energy transportation that is resolved by a continual genesis of pattern 
and structure whose morphological paradigm is the convection cell.  
It has also given rise to two byproducts, the best known of which is a mol-
ecule called carbon dioxide. A less familiar side effect in this conversion 
process is the production of a diverse range of particles called aerosols. 5 
Not all aerosols are human in provenance: besides particles with an anthro-
pogenic origin like sulfates and black carbon, the total aerosol budget for the 
planet includes dust and salt particles lifted off the surface of the earth and 
oceans by wind. The unique character of aerosol dispersion has been noted for 
some time, as in observations of the measurable temperature decrease that can 
occur downwind of industrial areas when the amount of solar energy reaching 
the surface is “dimmed.” 6 A dramatic natural equivalent occurred in 1816, 
known as the “year without a summer,” when a veil of sulfates caused by volca-
nic eruptions shrouded the earth, tinting sunsets a dark reddish hue, inspiring 
J. M. W. Turner’s iconic images of the skies above London painted that same 
year, and leading to devastating crop failure in much of Europe and North 
America. 7 The scientific recognition of this cataclysmic event, along with the 
Cold War fear that nuclear war would make for endless winters, prompted 
further attention to aerosol particles and their effects. Despite the renewed 
scrutiny, these floating bodies are only now beginning to reveal their impact 
on the world’s climate. Researching aerosol patterns is like a fractal form of bal-
listics, a difficult science of trade winds, turbulence, and jet streams that only 
climatologists have learned to read. Their baroque scripts are kaleidoscopic, 
describing maps of oceanic and atmospheric transport, and an astonishing 
interlinking of human fortune that is as glorious as it is terrifying.
Fig. 3. GEOS-5 aerosol 
transport simulation 
by William Putnam and 
Horace Mitchell. Aerosols 
are small atmospheric 
particles that can be 
produced by various 
means, such as dust or 
sand being blown into 
the sky above a desert, 
by volcanic eruptions, or 
by burning fossil fuels. 
Aerosols have become 
an important heuristic 
device for understand-
ing atmospheric air 
patterns since they carry 
a signature of their origin, 
allowing climate models 
projecting aerosol dis-
persion to be calibrated 
against observations 
and therefore improving 
their accuracy. The image 
on the left is a close-
up taken from a global 
simulation of aerosol 
dispersion run between 
April 2006 and April 2007 
showing dust marked 
red, sea salt marked blue, 
sulphate marked white 
and black, and organic 
carbon green. It clearly 
demonstrates the intensi-
ty of aerosol production 
from the industrialized 
northern hemisphere as 
well as the winds that 
carry these particles 
southeast. Image source: 
NASA/Goddard Space 
Flight Center.
Unlike C02, the proper-
ties of aerosol particles 
depend on their size, 
shape, and atmospheric 
location.  
 
Fig. 4. (left) Field-emis-
sion scanning electron 
microscope images of 
four different catego-
ries of soot particles. 
This image reveals the 
morphological variation 
of aerosol particles. Scale 
bars measure, 500 nm. 
Source: Swarup China 
et al., “Morphology and 
mixing state of individual 
freshly emitted wildfire 
carbonaceous particles,” 
Nature Communications, 
vol. 4 (2013), article no. 
2122.  
 
Fig. 5. (right) Image 
showing scalar variation 
in soot and sulphate 
aerosols. Source: Mihály 
Pósfai, Arizona State 
University.
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The World Dies from the North 
…the desert is one of the faces of the Mediterranean.
 — Fernand Braudel 13
The Sahel is one of the most heavily researched climatic zones in the world 
because it was the first to undergo significant and initially inexplicable cli-
matic variation at timescales longer than a decade — longer therefore than 
the El Niño Southern Oscillation cycle of seven years. 14 The droughts 
brought more than deprivation. An institutional apparatus of international 
aid agencies, donor organizations, financial institutions, medical missions, 
and other bodies united by concern, contractual obligation, and a lega-
cy of colonial politics arrived soon after. Then, with the waning of the 
drought in the ’90s and the recovery of the Sahel from its extended period 
of desiccation, a second wave of expertise converged upon the region: 
meteorologists, climate scientists, anthropologists, and ethnographers. 
Like an epistemic force field, every problem in the environment would 
soon attract new forms of knowledge around it. If a complex causal chain 
stretching over five thousand kilometers threads industrial activity in the 
Ruhr Valley to the number of water droplets hitting the ground in Senegal, 
Darfur or Burkina Faso, then another thread can be constructed in the 
opposite direction. If the first thread weaves through the atmosphere 
and the ocean, this second thread links distant territories across the 
surface of the earth. The two threads touch when the rain hits the earth. 
This moment of contact rests on a plurality of causes that must conspire 
in just the right way to produce an effect, be it drought or rain, or a delayed 
Fig. 6. Biases in the 
Atlantic Inter-tropical 
Convergence Zone (ITCZ) 
in seasonal interannual 
variations for a coarse 
and a high resolution, 
coupled climate model. 
This visualization 
effectively shows the 
movement of the ITCZ, 
especially the insta-
bility of different Sea 
Surface Temperatures 
(SST) as they meet and 
intermix along a shift-
ing equatorial line. The 
temperature differences 
indicated here by a red-
green color spectrum 
are a critical factor in the 
strength of the African 
Monsoon, which depends 
on differentials in SST 
for its intensity. Source: 
Tom Delworth and Keith 
Dixon, National Oceanic 
Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA)/Geophysical 
Fluids Dynamics Labora-
tory (GFDL), 2008.
Towering some fifteen kilometers above the surface of the earth, the for-
mation of these cells is held in check by the stability of the atmosphere in 
the area. Much like the crystallization processes where small irregularities 
in structure initiate the cascading process of molecular transformation, 
only if a certain threshold of instability is exceeded can the process of cell 
genesis begin. 10 As tropical ocean temperatures rise, the threshold for 
this instability also rises because it depends on a temperature differential 
between warm and cold seawater. 11 
Rain results from this instability. In the fertile equatorial region 
called the Intertropical Convergence Zone, this effect is organized 
around a conflict between mechanisms working at two different scales.  
In the first, the increase in the mean ocean temperature makes the 
threshold for convection difficult to reach. In the second, a local increase  
in terrestrial radiation increases evaporation and precipitation. The winner 
drives rainfall in West Africa. 12
Let us put this another way. Every single event of fossil fuel com-
bustion in Europe conspires to send a small stream of aerosol particles 
into the atmosphere. If these particles are emitted in the right kind of 
weather system, they will be carried high into the atmosphere and trans-
ported along air currents toward the Atlantic Ocean. Here, suspended  
thousands of meters above the seas, the particles will interact with 
incoming and outgoing solar energy, changing the temperature of the 
seas below. This affects evaporation levels in the sea and transforms 
moisture supply to the atmosphere. The shift in moisture supply in turn 
affects the location, timing, and intensity of the wet season that brings 
annual rain to the Sahel. 
If it is the case that activity in one part of the globe triggers a cli-
matic bifurcation in another then mapping, understanding, and repro-
ducing this system of gradients and differentials constitutes more than  
a particularly intractable problem in thermodynamic calculus, particle 
transport, or physicochemical interaction. What it becomes instead  
is the medium through which a future political claim will be made and  
a present crime prosecuted.
Fig. 7. Atmospheric 
carbon absorption by 
plants. The fluidity of 
climate change is poorly 
understood through 
cartographic forms of 
representation. As this 
still from a visualiza-
tion demonstrates, the 
amount of vegetation 
in the Sahel changes 
dramatically with the 
seasons, especially the 
monsoon rains which 
sweep up and down the 
continent. These oscilla-
tions repeat but they do 
so differentially as the 
patterns shift and adjust 
according to annual and 
decadal time scales due 
to variations in anthro-
pogenic forcing. The 
variability of this redistri-
bution poses a continual 
challenge to populations 
that must find ways to 
earn a livelihood from 
the land such as farmers 
and pastoralists. Image 
source: NASA/Goddard 
Space Flight Center, 2009.
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chain of causes and effects is forged within a unique field of inquiry, it carries 
with it the tones, manners of speaking, practices, instruments, historical ten-
dencies, and rationalities that structure thought and decision making within 
that field. Incommensu-
rability between the 
scales of climatic interac-
tion is as real as the 
incommensurability 
between different cogni-
tive and epistemic practic-
es. What is so often for-
gotten in the discussion 
of ecology is that differ-
ence pertains, and it per-
tains in such a way as to  
prevent making one thing 
the measure of all others. 
Points will always fail 
to coincide — and conflict 
can never cease to ensue. 
The Anthropocenic Equator
Rather than celebrating or affirming a post-human world, where man 
no longer deludes himself with regard to his primacy or distinction, 
and rather than asserting the joyous truth of ecology where life is finally 
understood as one vast, self-furthering interconnected organic whole, 
we should perhaps take note of the violent distinction of the human.
 — Clare Colebrook 19
As of January 2013, all eight situations before the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) involve African nations between the twentieth northern and 
the tenth southern parallel. Investigations in Uganda, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Central African Republic, Darfur-Sudan, Kenya, Libya, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and now Mali are confined to a narrow equatorial belt on a single 
continent, which US security experts now refer to as a “corridor of terror.” 
Within the Western media, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
a legacy of camps, displaced persons, and famines repetitively reinforce the 
view of the Sahel as a space synonymous with violence and suffering. The 
perception of a landscape characterized by either warlords, jihadists, and 
child soldiers on one side, or drought-stricken adults and starving children 
on the other, leaves sub-Saharan Africa in a bind, caught in a cliché of  
either hyperaggressivity (genocide, terror, and massacre) or hyperpassivity  
monsoon. Climate science renders this complexity perceptible, threading 
a line of reasoning that allows us to follow the aerosol on its path and visual-
ize the effects it leaves in its wake. Science is very good at posing these kinds 
of problems, but it will tell 
you almost nothing about 
how to organize kinship 
structures or manage social 
bonds in a condition of  
scarcity. For this one turns 
to other forms of knowledge.
Take the nuanced tempo-
ral descriptions of rain within 
West African communities, 
which — far from treating 
precipitation in numerical 
terms — describe rainfall tim-
ing with respect to planting, 
to its character in relation 
to runoff, to its effects 
in terms of crop yield. 15 While 
scientific reason must isolate 
each element from its neighbor to uncover correlations and then causal 
structures, indigenous forms of knowledge conceive of rain as part of an  
assemblage that has always already held together a series of different ele-
ments such as soil, water, and crops. Or consider the names of famine 
in Darfur, which attract no generic appellation and are instead in each 
instance referred to through a singular name describing the moral and 
behavioral effects of the event on the community. Most notably, Fur defini-
tions of famine refer to lived experiences; they distinguish between differ-
ent effects such as a scarcity or the erosion of social bonds, but they do not 
refer to starvation or to mortality, nor do they appeal to metrics, statistics, 
or other quantifiable forms of description, “… rural people of Darfur 
do not think of the populace as an anonymous aggregate population, but 
as a moral community.” 16 
These short examples of epistemological and cognitive differences are 
not presented in order to suggest a Babel of communities condemned 
to speak in indecipherable tongues, only to say that one cannot begin with 
the presumption of sameness, consistency, or unity among the various 
parties — be they scientific or indigenous — either in the kinds of claims they 
make or the meanings one can draw from them. Instead, one must begin 
with the idea of differences that are real and therefore not simply translat-
able. 17 Beyond their instrumentality in the region’s geopolitics, the multiper-
spectival character of these various forms of knowledge production do not 
resolve to form a unified picture. 18 There is no single map upon which each 
point can finally be plotted, each blank space filled. Because each link in the 
Fig. 8. Languages in Afri-
ca. This map of language 
groups is an indication 
of the diversity of the 
Sahel. The viability of 
rich cultural and spatial 
traditions is under threat 
as the quality of produc-
tive land transforms in 
response to anthropo-
genic climate change. 
Map © Steve Huffman, 
Global Mapping Interna-
tional, 2013.
Fig. 9. Areas affected by 
vegetative drought cor-
related to areas affected 
by conflict. Source: UNEP 
& Centre for Geoinfor-
matics (Z_GIS), Univer-
sity of Salzburg, Austria, 
October 2010.
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earth. The former conceive of territory according to a clear north-south 
striation forming a gradient of decreasing nomadism as one moves away 
from the desert; while in the latter, spatial practices follow a fluid distribu-
tion of opportunity that knows no clear territorial demarcation. These dif-
ferences are not essentialist traits; in fact, cultural markers such as Arab 
or African are fixed to livelihoods more than ethnicity. What is happening 
in the Sahel, besides conflicts over resources, institutional failure, and the 
instrumentalizaton of disorder by competing political claimants, is a con-
frontation between different modes of existence, as multiple spatial and 
cognitive practices superimpose on the same territory. 
As the Sahara colonizes the Sahel, continuing its expansion down  
into once fertile landscapes, the deadly march is perfectly captured by the 
Zaghawa people of Chad and Sudan who say, “the world dies from the 
north.” 24 In a condition of scarcity and within an ever narrowing band-
width of viability, the peoples of the Sahel are facing pressures to coexist: 
they make direct contact, they do not coincide, and yet they must still relate.
The Nation Ex-situ
At least until the process of the dissolution of the nation-state and its 
sovereignty has come to an end, the refugee is the sole category in which 
it is possible today to perceive the forms and limits of a political com-
munity to come.
 — Giorgio Agamben 25
Climate simulations reveal more than kaleidoscopic gradients of color; they 
expose the dynamic and differentiated form of climate impact, the dramatic 
reorganization of resource availability, biological viability, and human for-
tune — in short they present a set of new geopolitical maps. The emergence 
of newly productive land on the one hand and the exhaustion of existing 
productive territories on the other does more than generate alternative 
(malnutrition and underdevelopment). The very constitution of this crisis 
and the “concern” it enables form an integral component of the neoco-
lonial machinery and its management of foreign territories. 20 The ICC’s 
international jurisdiction, as set out in the Rome Statute and as outlined 
at the outset of this essay, is more imagined than real; today it is a tribunal 
established to judge the sins of the “South.” 
This South is always posed as a “not-yet” modern, “not-yet” complete 
project. It is framed in terms of its underdevelopment, described in terms 
of stagnations and pathologies which cannot but elicit sympathetic aid  
programs and rescue packages from the ever-vigilant North. 21 There 
is no more emblematic case of this 
gaze and its concrete material effects 
than Africa, whose supposed state 
of primordial chaos, poised forever 
on the threshold of arbitrary disor-
der and habitual violence exists — 
if indeed it does so — only to reflect 
back and secure an image of the 
norms and values of its paternalistic 
other. For decades, it was assumed 
that desertification in the Sahel was 
primarily caused by poor farming 
practices — that unsophisticated 
local farmers could not adapt 
to changing environmental condi-
tions as quickly as they needed 
to, leading to overgrazing, deforesta-
tion, and erosion; similarly, military 
conflict was and still is too often 
seen as a simple byproduct of eth-
nic and religious differences, the 
manifestation of ancient hatreds and tribal rivalries. More recently,  
however, anthropogenic climate change has forced a reexamination 
of these alleged causes. 22
The Sahel is marked by a high variability of annual precipitation. 
It is certain that heightened competition over shrinking plots of productive 
land have worked in concert with ongoing governmental and institutional 
failure to exacerbate existing conflicts, a situation that has been exploited 
by local elites — not only to further existing claims over land and markets, 
but also to displace narrations of conflict from a political to an environmen-
tal register. 23 Nonetheless, it is also the case that tensions between pastoral-
ists and farmers over dwindling resources has brought different territorial 
practices into closer proximity. As with the different conceptions of famine 
and drought noted above, in the case of Fur villagers and Arab pastoralists 
one finds radically different understandings of, and relationships to, the 
Fig. 10. The Anthropoce-
nic Equator. Today, the 
remit of the ICC exists 
between two parallels: 
20 degrees north and 10 
degrees south. Image: 
Adrian Lahoud and Alina 
McConnochie, 2012.
Fig. 11. The expansion of 
the Sahara. This image 
shows study areas over 
a 45-year time series of 
dune mobility indicating 
constant wind velocity 
over the central Sahara. 
Due to the paucity of 
local wind measure-
ments, scientists Pieter 
Vermeesch and Sebas-
tien Leprince turned to 
Landsat imagery and 
a sophisticated form of 
algorithmic analysis to 
construct a time series 
of dune mobility and 
therefore of wind veloc-
ity. This image shows 
the three study areas for 
the Bodélé Depression 
in northern Chad. Image: 
Pieter Vermeesch and 
Sebastien Leprince, 2008.
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twin poles of individuals without a state 
such as Palestinian refugees, or individuals 
that must be resettled due to the redraw-
ing of sovereign territorial borders as took 
place in the former Yugoslavia. Interna-
tional law emerges in response to violence 
between nation states as a way of redress-
ing conflict, including these issues of  
refugee status. Legal scholarship has 
internalized the concept of the refugee 
only in so far as the two possibilities 
described above continue to operate. 
New kinds of challenges emerge once the very viability of the nation 
state is threatened with dissolution. In response to this, legal scholar 
Maxine Burkett radicalizes the very idea of the deterritorialized subject 
by proposing the concept of “the Nation Ex-Situ”; that is to say, a nation for 
citizens without a territory. When a catastrophic loss of territorial produc-
tivity is incurred due to distant causes rather than indigenous acts, a chal-
lenge is posed to normative legal principles of harm, redress, and responsi-
bility. Climate migration is thus doubly complex, because its cause is not 
always attributable while its consequences in terms of human life considered 
in terms of numbers are also unclear, and for these reasons it occupies no  
distinct legal category. 28 The idea of a “nation ex-situ” then is an attempt 
to maintain a semblance of continuity through a legal construction that 
supports projects of cultural protection through the loss of land, resources, 
and an economy. 
The veracity of testimony is one basis on which both genocide and 
refugee claims will be assessed. Within international law, evidence in the 
form of human testimony assumed a singular importance after World War II,  
building on definitions of genocide and crimes against humanity used in  
trials such as that of Adolf Eichmann. 29 More recently, however, in the case 
of dangers posed to larger populations by environmental destruction, 
mathematical and scientific modes of knowing have come to complement 
human ones. 30 The mobilization of science and especially advanced forms 
of spatial and statistical analysis occupy an increasingly prominent position 
within the biopolitical problem of environmental violence. 31 Though they 
do not touch the body directly, environmental violations affect the milieu 
that bodies depend upon for their survival. 
But what happens to the “era of the witness” when a crime is no longer 
visible to unmediated human perception? In the case of climate change,  
climate justice and its deterritorialized claimants, will the era of the scientific 
model come to replace human testimony in adjudicating humanitarian 
claims? These new questions in law emerge in recognition of the challenges 
that climate change brings, the most important of which will be the nexus 
formed between climatology and criminology.
“patterns” of human settlement; it makes proximate foreign spatial practices, 
it makes different worlds touch — abundant evidence of which can already 
be found in our present condition of diasporic movements and displacements.
Because there is no movement without countermovement, and in re-  
sponse to this displacement, today the European border network is concep-
tualized through the idea of “prefrontiering,” a precognition of illegality 
materialized through treaties and cooperative security frameworks. 26 This 
infrastructure attempts to counteract refugee movement into the EU by  
shifting the burden of policing to non-EU states in order to limit the legal 
obligations conferred upon claimants within sovereign European territory. 
Refugee movements intensify during periods of drought. In Africa, 
drought is thought to be partially responsible for the long-term pattern 
of urbanization that the continent is experiencing. From the northward 
migrations out of the Sahara toward the Nile and Levant during the Holo-
cene, to annual routes of herders that follow the rains and pasture, the 
movement of people through the Sahel and across the Sahara has a long 
and rich history that, since the great drying of the Sahara thousands of  
years ago, has been increasingly organized by the coastal area to its distant 
north, and the cities to its south. 27 The tragedy of today’s Mediterranean 
is that this history of human  
passage is subject to a calculus 
in which bodies are marked 
as weapons on one side, demons 
on the other. Our own legacy 
in this story of passage will now 
resemble a loop, where bodies 
floating south through the  
atmosphere eventually receive 
a ghastly human complement 
floating north in the sea far below. 
The figure of the refugee — 
the deterritorialized subject par 
excellence — has a history that 
has been organized around the 
Figs. 12–14. Rescue of 
Migrants in the Mediterra-
nean Sea. Helicopter foot-
age published on October 
24, 2013 by Maltese Coast 
Guard showing the rescue 
of migrants attempting to 
reach Italy. Source: Navy 
of Malta, 2013.
Fig. 15. Frontex Risk 
Analysis Unit. Source: 
Frontex, Beyond the 
Frontiers. Frontex: The 
First Five Years (Warsaw, 
2010).
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All Things Being Equal
…when a concurrence of causes produces an effect, these causes have 
to be studied one at a time, and their laws separately investigated […] 
since the law of the effect is compounded of the laws of all the causes 
which determine it. 
— John Stuart Mill 34
Because any event, climatic or otherwise, is irreducible to a single expla-
nation, one way to imagine each event is as an outcome of causes conspir-
ing, or more simply as other events intersecting. In turn, because each 
cause is also an event in itself with its own private network of precursors, 
it is impossible to fully explicate any single event since this would mean 
following an infinite network. This is not really a problem, however, since 
some causes will contribute to the event’s character more than others. 
By disturbing this network of relations we can test which connections 
are relevant: an easy way to imagine this is to think about cutting threads 
on a web — if the web stays the same shape the thread was not structurally 
important. To “explain” an event is to set out causes with regard to a con-
text; implicit in this idea is that any reliable explanation will attend to the 
most relevant of causes — effectively pruning back unimportant threads 
in order to limit the potentially infinite space of explanation. 35 In turn, this 
means that any explanation is always indeterminate since it rests on a net-
work of amputated relations which are implicit or presupposed without 
being stated, either because they are thought not to bear upon the event 
significantly, or because they are commonly understood and do not need 
repeating. The Latin phrase ceteris paribus, meaning “all other things being 
equal” — or, less literally, “in the absence of disturbing factors” — refers 
to this method first described by Mill and found within different forms 
of reasoning, of isolating causal factors from a complex network. 36 
Let’s now consider the way some climatic zones produce a morphologi-
cally distinct type of weather pattern. The pattern exists in series, repeating 
annually over each wet season or, as with the El Niño cycle, every seven years; 
none of these forms are identical and yet they share a recognizable structure. 
Then let’s suppose that at some point in time, a mutation — that is to say 
a signal — emerges from the noise of “normal” morphological variability  
(the norm is in itself entirely contingent, the invocation of nature’s end — 
if it means anything it points only to the difficulty of establishing a baseline 
or reference in the sea of temporal variation). In attempting to identify this 
mutation, different causal factors will be isolated step-by-step in a simulation 
to see if a correlation can be found between a specific cause and this specific 
mutation or, as in the words of the previous analogy, a thread whose loss 
changes the shape of the web. However, correlation in itself does not give 
causation — it doesn’t say anything about the process that makes these vari-
ables relate. In order for causation to be determined, first there must be proof 
Climate Forensics
We are in a different world of proof than that of the archetypical 
smoking gun.
  — Jack Weinstein, Major General in the US Air Force 32 
Because the mechanics of climate form a complicated transport sys-
tem, redistributing the effects of pollution according to a process that 
is nonlinear and transboundary, the space of violation is separated 
from the space of its repercussion. Those least responsible for carbon 
emission will be most susceptible to drought and rising sea levels. 33 
Edmund Locard’s principle that “every contact leaves a trace” —  
the very cornerstone of modern forensics — still applies, but with one 
impossible catch: the contact and the trace drift apart, carried away 
on ocean currents and diffused into the atmosphere. The earth’s cli-
mate loosens the bond between cause and effect; it breaks the link 
between attribution, responsibility, and, potentially, justice. In the 
elongated space-time between the crime and its consequence, myriad 
forces intervene — clarifying them becomes not only a scientific priori-
ty, but also a political and ethical one. 
Furthermore, because the cause is in some way coextensive with 
everyday life, and because its consequence often occurs beyond our 
everyday experience of that life, the consequence is no longer recog-  
nizable or even proximate to its cause. We are summoned, then, 
to address a problem whose consequences we may never experience.  
Testimony, institutions of justice, their jurisdictions and modes 
of political, legal, or financial redress emerge from events that are  
more historically/experientially familiar. Unlike many indigenous  
cosmologies, Judeo-Christian ethics is finally circumscribed by the 
horizon of human experience; Western ethical systems drawn from  
the Enlightenment and forming the basis for Western law have little  
purchase on events beyond this horizon — events that are impercepti-  
ble without sophisticated technical mediation. In order for an alter-  
native ethico-legal reasoning to secure itself, a new kind of aesthetic  
and epistemic space must be established. This fragile tethering  
of different ways of knowing calls for a style of thought that is more  
attentive to shifting sites of veridiction, matters of sense and intelligi-  
bility. Much is at stake in holding this diverse series together  
(as we will see when we turn to the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Con-  
ference in the conclusion of the essay); displacing violence from the  
battlefield to the forum already required no less. Before this, howev-  
er, it is worth considering climatological reasoning and the question  
of scale a little more closely since it is here in the calculus — in fact,  
in the very mathematics — of the model that the political insists  
on re-inscribing itself.
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cess of scalar individuation by which a climate model is progressively speci-
fied in scale until it is able to reliably capture the relevant parts of the prob-
lem in question much like a sieve that must be calibrated so that its 
openings catch the correctly sized elements.
These five points — correlation, causation, path dependency, determina-
tion, and scale — form the basis for forensic climatology. The importance of  
this form of reasoning for constructing durable claims about climate change 
and climate attribution is not in doubt. What is as yet unclear, however, is the 
way this form of reasoning enters into and shapes nonscientific disputes over 
climate and climate justice: for hidden within the amputated web of relations 
that structure such reasoning is an indeterminate payload, one with the capac-
ity to radically repoliticize the apparent objectivity of any scientific claim. 
The Third Degree
We have been asked to sign a suicide pact.
 — Lumumba Di-Aping 39
Computational models seek to explain and predict the world’s climate. 
They can be understood in purely scientific terms, but only at the expense 
of unmeshing the models from the political and economic forces in which 
they are installed and for which they are called upon to work. By locating 
these models against the milieu of conflicts and negotiations that charac-
terize the struggle over global carbon capacity, the objectivity of science 
can be reframed in terms of its relevance within a political force field which 
scientific attention both enters into and shapes. A problem can be objective 
in a scientific sense yet nonetheless partial in a political sense, as we shall 
see with the argument about global average temperature increase. 
According to the Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report Climate Change 2013, the Earth’s temperature is likely 
to rise by 1.5 degrees according to most long-term scenarios (projection for 
2081–2100) and 2.0 degrees for many others. 40 As a nonscientist, there 
is no reason to question the accuracy of this figure or the objectivity of the rea-
soning that lies behind it, but there are very good reasons to scrutinize its 
relevance within discourse on climate change. First, the figure is a global aver-
age and conceals the uneven transformation of the planet’s climate; second, 
it obscures the fact that climate negotiations are first and foremost economic 
negotiations, arguments over growth rather than negotiations over tempera-
ture; third, it invites public misperception as to the consequences of even 
small temperature changes since humans experience far larger changes over 
the course of a normal day. 41 
Economic activity is highly carbon dependent: industrial and agricul-
tural production as well as consumption link GDP to emission. For these 
reasons, over the next century, forums charged with allocating global carbon 
that this deviation is not explainable by other causes. 37 Furthermore, some 
mechanism or relation must be proposed for connecting the elements together. 
Climatologists have learned to exploit the unique, nonlinear nature 
of climatological patterns. The fact that no two climate patterns are the 
same (despite sharing morphological similarities), far from being a problem, 
is precisely what allows for a forensic climatology: spatiotemporal pattern 
is the key. The difference is much like a fingerprint. Though left and right 
finger prints are expressions of the same gene, the difference between them 
results from the reciprocal interaction between genes and an information-rich 
environment of enzyme gradients, the relation between which guides mor-
phological development during embryogenesis. The path dependency of this 
process gives a unique signature on left and right prints since each print 
actualizes in response to a unique context of developmental noise. Climate 
forensics takes this principle of identification through path dependency a step 
much further. Instead of simply noting the shape of left and right prints 
in order to register formal difference, it will attempt to explain differentiations; 
that is, to uncover why the process of morphogenesis unfolded in exactly 
this as opposed to any other way.
It is here that a durable claim about causal relations begins to be threaded 
through the different elements of the climate system. To accomplish this 
feat, the question of scale is paramount. Take aerosol dispersion: even 
if it were computationally possible, little would be gained by tracking every 
single one of the 10 40 particles in the atmosphere. Similarly, conceiving 
aerosol content as a global mean, in the way that CO2 is measured, would 
reveal almost nothing. In the first 
instance, the explanatory mesh 
is overdetermined, carrying too 
high a resolution and too much 
redundant information (taking into 
account every single particle); in the 
second case, the explanatory mesh 
is underdetermined and has too 
coarse a resolution (a global mean). 38 
What is missed in both these exam-
ples is the spatiotemporal pattern. 
The epistemic frame that tries 
to capture the salient ontological 
characteristics is poorly calibrated, 
there is something in between that 
must be understood — namely, scale; 
that is to say, an objective correlation 
between the ontological causal 
structure and its reproduction 
in some epistemic frame. In this 
sense, we can understand the pro-
Fig. 16. Scalar subdi-
vision of earth within 
a climate model. There 
have been significant 
advances in the resolu-
tion of climate models in 
the last twenty years as 
computational speed has 
increased, and yet many 
important phenomena 
such as aerosols and 
clouds exist at a sub-cal-
culable scale — being too 
small to be caught by 
 existing methods of spa-
tial subdivision. There is 
no agreement on the opti-
mal grid type, with some 
scientists and mathema-
ticians arguing for the 
dynamic transformation 
of resolution in response 
to the scale of phenom-
ena that must captured. 
Others argue for an 
even grid coverage, 
 suggesting that areas 
with seemingly little 
activity may nonetheless 
play an important, if as 
yet unknown, role. Image: 
Adrian Lahoud and Jose 
Sanchez, 2012.
Ecologies 513512 Floating Bodies
capacity will become paradigmatic spaces of conflict both between states 
and nonstate actors such as corporations. The 2009 Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen, as well as Kyoto before it, were unique histori-
cal events. Despite Copenhagen’s failure, it is worth reflecting on the 
unprecedented strangeness of a forum in which world leaders ostensibly 
gather to discuss the acceptable level of the earth’s temperature.
During the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference the public debate 
was framed by two simple questions: Would an accord be signed or not? 
And what would be an acceptable temperature increase? The latter question 
revolved around a series of figures: would it be 1.5 degrees, 2 degrees,  
3 degrees, 3.5 degrees? But in the midst of the negotiations, and with the  
fate of Africa’s Sahel at stake, a transformative moment occurred which 
welded the scientific and the economic to the political again. On Decem-
ber 8, 2009, during a hastily convened private press conference, the 
Sudanese diplomat representing the G77 group of 132 developing 
nations, Lumumba Di-Aping, broke down and uttered a distinctly undip-
lomatic phrase, “We have been asked to sign a suicide pact,” in reference 
to the so called “Danish text” that had been tabled, and its proposed  
2 degree global average increase. This brief eruption carries into speech  
within a public forum the reality of a private calculus and its implicit pre-
supposition, linking responsibility for climate change, economic activity 
and, most importantly, foregrounding the unequal distribution of  
anthropogenic impact. The proposed global average of 2 degrees meant  
3.5 degrees in many of the nations that Di-Aping represented —  
a catastrophic result for sub-Saharan Africa. 42 Committing the G77 
to the Danish proposal would not only condone this catastrophe, 
it would legitimize it: the organization was being invited to become  
party to the devastation of its members. 
Why should temperature increase be posed at a global scale rather 
than a local one, which would allow for an assessment of impact accord-
ing to specific populations? The answer is both technical and political. 
It is technical in so far as smaller scale predictions are more difficult, 
which is why predicting the climate is easier than predicting the weather. 
It is political — not because the average figure is subjective, but because 
its very objectivity operates at a scale that mystifies the real and uneven 
extent of change; what is at stake here is the relevance of the truth — its 
truer truth — and not its objectivity or disputability. The conceptualiza-
tion of climate change as a global average does little to clarify its impact 
on people. 43 If the scale of argument is shifted from a planetary one 
to a local one, different pictures emerge. In the Sahel, the impact of water 
stress, reduced crop yields, and new disease vectors could lead to an addi-
tional 300,000 deaths on the continent per year in the immediate term, 
with double that number in the coming decades. 44 This does not include 
any possible deaths caused by the exacerbation of existing conflicts and 
refugee movements due to war and famine. 
As the climate conference disbanded, with 
news of Di-Aping’s claim of “climate genocide” 
spreading, hundreds of thousands of protestors 
gathered outside the Bella Centre in Copenha-
gen. Di-Aping’s response to the colonial men-
tality of the G20 (“we have been asked to sign 
a suicide pact”) and his invocation of the death 
camps of the Second World War (“climate 
genocide”) were unexpected. His dissident 
utterance succeeded in breaking all protocol. 
He was immediately criticized by conservative 
sections of the media who, indignant that 
he had so intentionally failed to follow the 
norms of diplomacy, called for his resignation. 
The idea that a Sudanese person would speak 
out in such a way in the context of a major 
international conference elicited derisory  
comments that suggested a lack of responsibility, 
disingenuousness, and unproductive hyperbole. 
Di-Aping’s status as a speaking subject and chairman of 132 nations was 
called into further question because of the continuing criminal proceedings 
against President Omar al-Bashir regarding war crimes in Darfur. What 
many commentators failed to realize is that it was precisely Di-Aping’s 
proximity to events in Darfur that provided him with a visceral sense 
of what a change in temperature could mean. 
Di-Aping’s statement disrupted the existing order of what can and cannot 
be said, what can and cannot be seen, and what can and cannot be constituted 
as a problem. After this disruption a new terrain of relevance was produced, 
no longer posed in terms of global averages and degrees but rather in terms 
of mortality, livelihoods, and the differential impact of heat. Beyond even this 
however, a far more radical reading might be possible: Di-Aping’s comments 
constitute more than an articulate plea for participation in dialogue; they 
might be much more still than a dissident speech act or disruption of the dip-
lomatic order. Is it not possible that what this statement amounted to is a  
political demand for a new type of  mathematics — a differently-scaled calculus?  
His call, then, is an attempt to reestablish the proper political scale within 
a debate about temperature increases in order to make specific populations 
visible and calculable within the model and therefore the argument. 
Di-Aping’s deliberate violation of diplomatic protocol should finally 
be read in these terms, since what the event in Copenhagen conclusively 
revealed is that within each degree of temperature increase, billions of “first 
world” dollars are congealed. Fossilized deep within every scientific model  
and dispute over average temperature increase is a nonscientific, ethico- 
political paradigm. Inside every simulation, inside every single degree, a new 
calculus of life and death is disguised. 45
Fig. 17. (above) Lumumba 
Di-Aping. Press confer-
ence December 11, 2009. 
United Nations Climate 
Change Conference, 
Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Still image capture from 
“Lumumba Di-Aping 
of the G77—The Most 
Important COP Briefing 
the World Never Heard | 
Part 5,” http://youtu.be/
Vtjbuq4fsRY. 
 
Fig. 18. (below) Luis 
Gabriel Moreno Ocampo, 
first Prosecutor for the 
International Criminal 
Court, Tallinn, February 
7, 2012. Photo: Estonian 
Foreign Ministry, Creative 
Commons License.
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The Chain of Immanence
UN climate change negotiations are not “environmental”: they are 
about the economic future of nations.
 — Radoslav S. Dimitrov 46
In the 1991 Gulf War, for every day the fires caused by the detonation 
of almost six hundred Kuwaiti wellheads burned, they released ten times 
more oil-related pollutants than the daily industrial output of the United 
States. In this comparative fact lies an interesting equation, a certain kind 
of equivalence between war and peace, captured well by Michel Serres in the 
epigraph to this essay when he writes: “Our peacetime economic relations, 
working slowly and continuously, produce the same results as would a short 
global conflict, as if war no longer belonged to soldiers alone now that 
it is prepared and waged with devices as scientific as those used by civilians 
in research and industry. Through a kind of threshold effect, the growth 
of our means makes all ends equal.” 47 In some sense then, what for Serres 
separates the state of war from the state of peace is a speed, a difference 
in pattern or intensity, a distribution in time and space. 48
It is now possible to precisely reframe the question posed at the begin-
ning of this essay: can we imagine a form of violence without a violent 
event? The question we face now is: can we clarify the genesis of structures 
that authorize indirect violence? Or in other terms, can we bring the contact 
and the trace back together again? 
Do we risk making familiar forms of violence more ambiguous and  
therefore less operative through the concept of structural violence? It is  
an important question: if everything is violent, then nothing is violent. 
This hesitation rests on a flawed premise however: “structure” is not every-
thing. Nor is it simply a punctually violent event, and here lies the philo-
sophical and political challenge: to discern with enough precision and  
attention the action of this network and its agents, to follow the threads 
of relation where they lead, to rigorously unfold the complex causal links 
in this thing called “structure.” The purpose of this new cartography is not 
to absolve agents or individuals from responsibility, as if the structure 
itself should be indicted. On the contrary, it is to make individuals aware 
of and responsible for the consequences of their actions, whether they 
represent themselves or larger entities such as nations and corporations. 
In the indigenous understanding of famine and territory, the medical 
calculus of mortality, the statistical patterning of genocide, the scale of math-
ematical models, the visualizations of sea-surface temperatures, the plurality 
of legal structures and their conflicting jurisdictions, in satellite photos reg-
istering changes in vegetation and tracking boats packed with migrants 
attempting to cross the Mediterranean without succumbing to the seas, one 
finds epistemic frames and virtues that do not coincide to form a single 
world but rather superimpose like the split perspectives in a fractured mir-
ror. So too with the various forums and spaces of discourse that this visual 
evidence enters into, and where it attempts to make itself heard: the hotel 
conference halls used for an ICC investigation or to host a climate summit, 
the press conferences, the rural councils, the courts and parliaments, and 
academic institutions. Each ontological, epistemic, and discursive individua-
tion — each phenomenon, frame, and forum — creates its own distribution 
of relevant and irrelevant points, a unique order of what can be counted, what 
can be said, what can be made visible. 
And what is now becoming visible, what is being represented, made 
available for experience and also for judgment, is more than a set of bonds 
that tie together distant fates. What appears today is the extension of a colo-
nial project into the atmosphere itself. Like the industrial age that produced 
it, the Anthropocene is playing host to its own scramble for sovereignty, 
a colonial drive that now extends into the air and its capacity for life. As with 
the Berlin Conference of 1884 before it, Copenhagen assumed all the proto-
cols and formalities of international law and diplomacy, and though the con-
flict is now over atmospheric resources like carbon, rather than terrestrial 
resources like ivory, Copenhagen, like Berlin, attempted to exclude African 
representation from the forum of negotiation. Lumumba Di-Aping was one 
of the only delegates present to recognize Copenhagen for what it was — 
a crime scene. 49 His speech act reminds us that when it came to the decol-
onization of land, the law followed force. As the earth closes in on us, what 
makes us think that decolonizing the sky will be any different? 
Fig. 19. (left) Kuwait Oil 
Fires, 1991. Photo: Robert 
Bumpas/National Science 
Foundation. Creative 
Commons License.  
 
Fig. 20. (right) Ruhr valley 
Industrial Centre, 2009. 
Photo: AP Photo/Frank 
Augstein.
Ecologies 517516 Floating Bodies
1 Michel Serres, The Natural Contract (Ann Arbor: 
 University of Michigan Press, 1995), 32.
2 The term “monotheism” is used here to refer to any 
system of thought with a consistent ontological and 
 epistemological structure.
3 The French problématique is used to indicate the way this 
concept emerges from a history of French epistemological 
thought, primarily in the writings of Gaston Bachelard 
and Michel Foucault, and then especially later in Gilles 
Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (London: Continuum, 
2004).
4 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense (London: Continuum, 
2004), 306–07. 
5 Unlike CO2, which is temporally long-lived and spatially 
diffuse, aerosol particles remain suspended in the atmo-
sphere for less than a week and are therefore localized 
within parts of the earth’s atmosphere. Nonetheless they 
have a significant, if more spatio-temporally patterned, 
effect on climate. See also J.M. Prospero, R.J. Charlson, 
V. Mohen, R. Jaenicke, A.C. Delany, J. Moyers, W. Zoller, 
and K. Rahn, “The Atmospheric Aerosol System: An 
Overview,” Review of Geophysics and Space Physics, vol. 21, 
no. 7 (1983): 1607–29; and S.K. Satheesh and K. Kirshna 
Moorthy,  “Radiative effects of natural aerosols: A Review,” 
 Atmospheric Environment, vol. 39 (2005): 2089–110.
6 H. Moosmüller, R.K. Chakrabarty, and W.P. Arnott, 
“Aerosol light absorption and its measurement: A review,” 
Journal of Quantitative Spectroscopy & Radiative Transfer, 
vol. 110 (2009): 844–78.
7 C.S. Zerefos, V.T. Gerogiannis, D. Balis, and 
A. Kazantzidis, “Atmospheric effects of volcanic eruptions 
as seen by famous artists and depicted in their paint-
ings,” Atmospheric Chemisty and Physics, vol. 7 (2007): 
4027–42.
8 Michel Serres, The Birth of Physics (Manchester: Clinamen 
Press, 2000), 67.
9 Leon D. Rotstayn and Ulrike Lohmann, “Tropical Rainfall 
Trends and the Indirect Aerosol Effect,” Journal of Climate, 
vol. 15 (2002): 2103–16.
10 Gilbert Simondon uses this example to introduce the 
concept of transduction, finally extending it beyond the 
action of crystallization to describe the structuring of any 
metastable field. See Gilbert Simondon, “The Genesis of 
the Individual,” in Jonathan Crary and Stanford Kwinter, 
eds., Incorporations (New York: Zone Books, 1992).
11 Alessandra Giannini, “Mechanisms of Climate Change in 
the Semiarid African Sahel: The Local View,” Journal of 
Climate, vol. 23 (2010): 743–56.
12 The key role played by Sea Surface Temperatures (SST) 
has been the subject of a series of landmark papers pub-
lished by Alessandra Giannini at The Earth Institute at 
Columbia University in collaboration with colleagues in 
other climate research centers in the United States. Build-
ing on important work by Leon Rotstayn and colleagues at 
the CSIRO on the sensitivity of SST to aerosol emission, 
this research reverses decades of orthodoxy that argued 
that local anthropogenic transformation (i.e., African 
agricultural practice) were responsible for desertification. 
The work concludes by proposing that persistent drought 
in the Sahel is not local in origin but rather the result of an 
increase in SST in which aerosol emission plays an import-
ant role. See Michela Biasutti and Alessandra Giannini, 
“Robust Sahel drying in response to late 20th century 
forcings,” Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 33 (2006), 
L11706. See also Leon D. Rotstayn and Ulrike Lohmann, 
“Tropical rainfall trends and the indirect aerosol effect,” 
Journal of Climate, vol. 15 (2002): 2103–16. For an overview 
see Alessandra Giannini, Michela Biasutti, Isaac M. Held, 
and Adam H. Sobel, “A global perspective on African 
climate,” Climatic Change, vol. 90 (2008): 359–83. See also 
Alessandra Giannini et al., “A unifying view of climate 
change in the Sahel linking intra-seasonal, interannual and 
longer time scales,” Environmental Research Letters, vol. 8 
(2013), 024010.
13 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean 
World in the Age of Phillip II (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1995), 24.
14 The word Sahel is thought to mean “shore,” as in the Arabic 
Sahil, which refers to the edge where land meets sea — the 
Sahara desert forming an analogous edge with the savan-
nah. In fact the word Sahel becomes — among West African 
Arabs, initially — the word for the sea to their north, that is 
to say the Mediterranean. 
15 C.T. West, C. Roncoli, and F. Ouattara, “Local percep-
tions and regional climate trends on the central plateau of 
Burkina Faso,” Land Degradation & Development, vol. 19, 
no. 3 (May/June 2008): 289–304.
16 In Darfur the names of famine refer to conditions of social 
breakdown—the suspension of community and the prom-
ise of its reformulation at some point in the future. Alex 
De Waal notes an important distinction in naming deadly 
famines that do not merit a separate name but are simply 
appended with the term “famine that kills” (maja’a al gat-
ala). He concludes that this state marks a crossing “where 
naming breaks down” and, more critically perhaps, that 
“the destitution and social breakdown it causes are more 
significant for the sufferers than the fact of mortality.” 
Alex de Waal, Famine That Kills: Darfur, Sudan (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 75. For a comprehensive 
treatment of the calculus and the politics of humanitarian 
aid, see the chapter “Arendt in Ethiopia” in Eyal Weizman, 
The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from 
Arendt to Gaza (London: Verso, 2011), 27–62.
17 See Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence (Cam-
bridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
18 See Eduardo Batalha Viveiros de Castro, “Exchanging 
Perspectives: The Transformation of Objects into Subjects 
in Amerindian Ontologies,” Common Knowledge, vol. 10, 
no. 3 (Fall 2004), 463–84.
19 Claire Colebrook, “Extinction: Framing the End of the 
Species,” in Colebrook, ed., Extinction (Living Books 
About Life/Open Humanities Press, 2012), unpaginated.
20 See also Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The 
Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1994). 
21 See also Franco Cassano, “For a Thought from the South,” 
in Southern Thought and Other Essays on the Mediterranean 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 1–6.
22 In a 2007 Washington Post article, UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon proposed anthropogenic climate change as 
a contributor. Ban Ki-moon, “A Climate Culprit in  
Darfur,” Washington Post, June 16, 2007. See also note  
12 above.
23 H. Verhoeven, “Climate Change, Conflict and Develop-
ment in Sudan: Global Neo-Malthusian Narratives and 
Local Power Struggles,” Development and Change, vol. 
42, no. 3 (2011): 679–707; and Mathieu Couttenier, and 
Raphael Soubeyran, “Drought and Civil War in Sub- 
Saharan Africa,” The Economic Journal (2013), doi: 10.1111.
24 Alex De Waal, “Is Climate Change the Culprit for 
 Darfur?” African Arguments, June 25, 2007, http:// 
africanarguments.org/2007/06/25/is-climate-change 
-the-culprit-for-darfur/.
25 Giorgio Agamben, “Beyond Human Rights,” in Means 
without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and 
Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2000), 15–26, at 16.
26 See Anthony Lodge, Beyond the Frontiers. Frontex: The First 
Five Years (Warsaw: Frontex, 2010). 
27 Terms like “displacement,” “migration,” and “refugee” 
are tactically adopted and refused, in that they form the 
frame through which political claims can be made. Because 
the political management of movement depends on these 
terms, the legal thresholds that distinguish between the 
practices and therefore the actors involved become heavily 
contested. More recently, paleoclimatologists suggest that 
the great drying of the Sahara can only be explained by 
simulating non-anthropogenic aerosols in the atmosphere, 
i.e. the influence of Saharan dust. For a long-term history 
see Rudolph Kuper and Stefan Kröpelin, “Climate-Con-
trolled Holocene Occupation in the Sahara: Motor of 
Africa’s Evolution,” Science, vol. 313 (2006): 803–07. 
28 See Maxine Burkett, “The Nation Ex-Situ: On climate 
change, deterritorialized nationhood and the post-climate 
era,” Climate Law, vol. 2 (2011): 345–74.
29 For a discussion of shifting ideas of testimony, see Thomas 
Keenan and Eyal Weizman, Mengele’s Skull: The Advent of 
a Forensic Aesthetics (Berlin and Frankfurt am Main: Stern-
berg Press and Portikus, 2012).
30 See Solomon M. Hsiang, Marshall Burke, Edward 
Miguel, “Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human 
 Conflict,” Science, vol. 341, no. 6151 (September 2013),  
doi: 10.1126/science.1235367.
31 Tal Golan, “A preliminary history of epidemiological 
evidence in the twentieth-century American Courtroom.” 
Unpublished manuscript, 2011. See also Sheila Jasanoff, 
“Science and the Statistical Victim: Modernizing Knowl-
edge in Breast Implant Litigation,” Social Studies of Science, 
vol. 32, no. 1 (Feb. 2002): 37–69.
32 Weinstein speaking in reference to the 1984 Agent Orange 
claim lodged by US veterans of the Vietnam War against the 
government. Quoted in Golan, “A preliminary history,” 7. 
33 African nations, in both absolute and per capita terms, are 
insignificant sources of emissions on a global scale. On 
average, each resident of sub-Saharan Africa produces 
less than a ton of CO2 per year, compared with an average 
European’s annual output of 8.2 tons of CO2 and the 
average North American’s of 19.9 tons. Whether or not 
most sub-Saharan countries sign up to a post-Kyoto deal 
will have little impact on global emissions. However, cases 
such as Darfur are being held up as cautionary tales for the 
potential impact of climate change everywhere. In other 
words, African nations are not the intended audience of the 
post-Kyoto debate, but they are part of the evidence being 
used to make it. See Oli Brown, Anne Hammill, and Robert 
McLeman, “Climate change as the ‘new’ security threat: 
implications for Africa,” International Affairs, vol. 83, no. 6 
(2007): 1141–54. 
34 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy with some of 
their Applications to Social Philosophy (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1843), VI.9.3.
35 See also Alan Garfinkel, Forms of Explanation: Rethinking 
the Questions in Social Theory (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1981).
36 As a conditional statement, it makes any cause dependent 
on a supposition, and therefore non-universal, and only 
generalizable if said conditions are met. See also Marc 
Lange, “Who’s afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How 
I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them,” Erkenntnis, 
vol. 57, no. 3 (2002): 407–23.
37 Nonlinear systems like the climate produce signature 
bifurcations in response to different forcings. Exploiting 
this path dependency by exploring a set of counter-factuals 
allows for different forcings to be compared to observations.
38 Biological mathematicians Giuseppe Longo and Francis 
Bailly argue that the impossibility of computing non- 
linear behavior in open systems can be attributed to the 
non-trivial difference between the continuous nature  
of the phenomena and the repeatable addressability  
of discrete points in the systems used to describe them. 
For Longo and Bailly, it is possible to say that language 
and matter are incommensurable, or perhaps that while 
computers can repeat, only God can miscalculate. 
Giuseppe Longo and Francis Bailly, “Objective and 
Epistemic Complexity in Biology (Towards a ‘conceptual 
organization’),” invited lecture, International Conference 
on Theoretical Neurobiology, New Delhi, National Brain 
Research Centre, February 2003. See also Guiseppe  
Longo, “From exact sciences to life phenomena:  
following Schrödinger and Turing on Programs, Life  
and Causality,” Information and Computation, no. 207 
(2009): 545–58, at 553.
39 “Di-Aping first attacked the 2 degrees C warming 
maximum that most rich countries currently consider 
acceptable. Referring continuously to science, in particular 
to parts of the latest IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change) report, which he referenced by page 
and section, he said that 2 degrees C globally meant 3.5 
degrees C for much of Africa. He called global warming 
of 2 degrees C ‘certain death for Africa,’ a type of ‘climate 
fascism’ imposed on Africa by high carbon emitters. He 
said Africa was being asked to sign on to an agreement that 
would allow this warming in exchange for $10 billion, and 
that Africa was also being asked to 'celebrate' this deal.” 
Adam Welz, “Emotional scenes at Copenhagen: Lumumba 
Di-Aping @ Africa civil society meeting—8 Dec 2009,” 
http://adamwelz.wordpress.com/2009/12/08 
/emotional-scenes-at-copenhagen-lumumba-di-aping 
-africa-civil-society-meeting-8-dec-2009/, last accessed 
November 2013.
Ecologies 519518 Floating Bodies
40 For more detailed analysis of the scenarios, see Thomas 
Stocker, Qin Dahe, Gian-Kasper Plattner, et al., “Work-
ing Group I contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment 
Report Climate Change 2013: the Physical Science Basis,” 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2013, 53.
41 In his otherwise excellent book, A Vast Machine, Paul 
 Edwards states: “On an idealized view, high-quality scientif-
ic knowledge should and will automatically command policy 
choices, limiting disputes by partisans to no.s of imple-
mentation. Yet the implication of this profound authority is 
that credible science can be translated directly into political 
power.” This is indicative of a certain technocratic concept 
of information and its relation to decision making. What is 
in question here is exactly the opposite: less the credibility 
of science vis-à-vis science and more the relevance of science 
vis-à-vis politics. Paul N. Edwards, A Vast Machine: Com-
puter Models, Climate Data and the Politics of Global Warming 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2010), 406.
42 See Brodie Ramin, “Slums, climate change and human 
health in sub-Saharan Africa,” Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization, vol. 87 (2009), 886–86. Increasingly there 
are calls to link climate change analysis to health and mor-
tality projections. See Simon Lewis, “It’s time for a body 
count,” Guardian, February 26, 2008. Mortality rates 
are difficult to estimate due to the mixed causal factors 
involved. Nonetheless some attempts have been made. 
For a review see Andrew C. Revkin, “Forum Says Climate 
Shift Brings Deaths,” New York Times, May 29, 2009.
43 Part of the reason for this is that scientific research has been 
directed toward global models, in part due to the need to 
understand the climate system in comprehensive terms, but 
also because this is where funding has been directed. Fur-
ther, there are real technical limits on existing capacities to 
model impact at smaller resolutions.
44 Andrew C. Revkin “Forum says Climate Shift Brings 
Death,” New York Times, May 29, 2009. 
45 For further elaboration on Copenhagen see also Adrian 
Lahoud, “The Third Degree: Interrogating the Scale of 
Climate Conflict,” in Ines Weizman, ed., Architecture and 
the Paradox of Dissidence (London: Routledge, 2013). 
46 Radoslav S. Dimitrov, “Inside UN Climate Change Nego-
tiations: The Copenhagen Conference,” Review of Policy 
Research, vol. 27, no. 6 (2010): 795–821.
47 Serres, The Natural Contract, 32.
48 See also Paulo Tavares and Adrian Lahoud, “Fifth Geneva 
Convention: Nature, conflict, and international law in the 
Anthropocene,” http://www.forensic-architecture.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/5th-Geneva-Convention 
-Tavares-Lahoud.pdf.
49 The crime scene was even marked with blood: Claudia 
Salerno, G77 member and Lead Climate Negotiator for 
Venezuela was forced to slam the table in order to be heard 
during a session in which the chair continually ignored her 
requests to speak; eventually, she continued her speech 
with her bloodied palm raised in front of her.
Forensic Architecture in collaboration with SITU Research
Case:  Guatemala
